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Comparing future patterns of energy system change in 2°C 1 
scenarios with historically observed rates of change 2 
 3 
Abstract 4 
This paper systematically compares modeled rates of change provided by global integrated 5 
assessment models aiming for the 2°C objective to historically observed rates of change. Such a 6 
comparison can provide insights into the difficulty of achieving such stringent climate stabilization 7 
scenarios. The analysis focuses specifically on the rates of change for technology expansion and 8 
diffusion, emissions and energy supply investments. The associated indicators vary in terms of system 9 
focus (technology-specific or energy system wide), temporal scale (timescale or lifetime), spatial scale 10 
(regional or global) and normalization (accounting for entire system growth or not). Although none of 11 
the indicators provide conclusive insights as to the achievability of scenarios, this study finds that 12 
indicators that look into absolute change remain within the range of historical growth frontiers for the 13 
next decade, but increase to unprecedented levels before mid-century. If overall system growth is taken 14 
into account the study finds that monetary-based normalization metrics (GDP, investments and to some 15 
degree capacity) result in less conservative outcomes than energy-based normalization metrics 16 
(primary energy). This is in particular true for indicators that experience rapid rates of change (for both 17 
technology-specify and system-focus indicators). By applying a diverse set of indicators alternative, 18 
complementary insights into how scenarios compare with historical observations are acquired but they 19 
do not provide further insights on the possibility of achieving rates of change that are beyond current 20 
day practice. 21 
 22 
Keywords: integrated assessment modeling; energy system change; technological change; model 23 
validation; 2 degrees; feasibility 24 
 25 
1 Introduction 26 
Keeping temperature increase to less than 2ºC with a high likelihood will require substantial changes in 27 
energy and land use. Integrated assessment model (IAM) studies on mitigation scenarios can provide 28 
insights into the level of the required change over time. IAM-based studies often conclude that the 29 
required transition for reaching the 2ºC target is ‘technically feasible’, depending on the model set-up 30 
and assumptions. In the past, such studies generally considered rather idealised conditions such as full 31 
participation of all regions and sectors in climate policy. However, more recently, models have also 32 
studied the achievability of the 2°C target under less idealized circumstances assuming limits in 33 
technology availability or reduced participation in international climate policy (Clarke et al., 2009; 34 
Kriegler et al., 2013b; Riahi et al., 2015; Weyant and Kriegler, 2014). Even in those cases, most models 35 
still identify scenarios that reduce emissions in line with the 2°C target. It should, however, be noted that 36 
in their assessment, IAMs mostly account for technological and economic factors that can be easily 37 
included in the models. This, for instance, includes constraints like mitigation potentials, capital stock 38 
turnover rates, mitigation costs and inertia in investments patterns. Several other factors are not 39 
included such as the role of international negotiations, societal inertia or the time associated with 40 
decision-making processes on the one hand and behaviour changes on the other. Clearly, such factors 41 
can have a substantial influence on the probable (future) rate of change..  42 
 43 
Historically observed rates of change can be important reference points for assessing the difficulty 44 
associated with future rates of change – providing possibly also insights in real world factors not 45 
covered in the models. In fact, several studies have already tried to compare model results and 46 
historical data using different indicators (Kramer and Haigh, 2009; Loftus et al., 2014; Riahi et al., 2015; 47 
Tavoni and van der Zwaan, 2009; Van Der Zwaan et al., 2013; Van Vuuren et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 48 
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2012). In these studies different methods and data sets have been used to confront existing scenarios 49 
with historical evidence, meaning that their results and conclusions cannot be easily compared. For 50 
instance, Van Vuuren et al. and Riahi et al. looked at overall change in emissions or emission intensity. 51 
In contrast, the studies of Van der Zwaan et al. and Wilson et al. look at absolute and relative changes 52 
in the deployment of particular energy technologies. It should also be noted that model comparison 53 
projects have shown that models select different pathways in achieving similar goals, and that models 54 
can be ‘diagnosed’ as being more or less responsive to climate policy (Kriegler et al., 2015). In order to 55 
represent model uncertainty, it is therefore important to compare the results of a diverse set of IAMs 56 
against a standardized set of historical indicators. 57 
 58 
In this light, the goal of this study is 1) to systematically compare several methods that use historical 59 
evidence as a basis for analyzing the difficulty associated with future energy transitions and 2) to use 60 
these methods for evaluating model results. We use the results of a multi-model study to provide insight 61 
into the uncertainty resulting from a wide diversity of technology trajectories that are consistent with the 62 
2ºC target. Questions that are addressed are: 63 
- How do historical rates of change compare to future rates of change required under the 2°C 64 
climate objective? 65 
- Do various indicators of technology change depict a coherent storyline?  66 
 67 
2 Methodology 68 
2.1 Comparing historical and future rates of change 69 
Historical observations provide an important reference point for the required level of effort to achieve 70 
future energy system changes associated with ambitious climate policy objectives. To date, different 71 
indicators have been used to compare historical trends with future rates of change, varying in terms of 72 
system focus (technology-specific or energy system wide), temporal scale (timescale or lifetime), spatial 73 
scale (regional or global) and normalization (accounting for entire system growth). In order to gain a 74 
more holistic insight from these analyses we combine and harmonize the methods to encompass an 75 
overall similar scope of research. In the following paragraphs the various methods are described first  76 
followed by how they are interpreted in the current study. Table 1 and Table 2 provide summaries of the 77 
metrics used and scope of study. Figure 1 provides a visual example of the introduced methods. 78 
2.1.1 Indicator a): Annual capacity addition 79 
Van der Zwaan et al. investigated historical and future capacity growth by comparing the average 80 
annual capacity additions (in GW/yr) in a multi-model context for low-carbon technologies for the short-81 
term (2010-2030) and medium-term (2030-2050) (Van Der Zwaan et al., 2013). The study focused on 82 
the absolute rate of change required to reach the 2°C target compared to rates experienced during 83 
historical periods of rapid expansion for established technologies (e.g. natural gas power) and newer 84 
technologies (e.g., solar power). The comparison provided easy interpretable insights into the 85 
expansion rate for future deployment versus historical figures published in literature and online 86 
databases (e.g. EPIA, 2014; Platt’s, 2013; US EIA, 2014). 87 
 88 
Annual capacity addition = 0
0
(newly installed capacity)
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¦
 89 
 90 
Using this approach, Van der Zwaan et al. concluded that future global expansion rates need to 91 
increase significantly, reaching expansion rates well beyond those observed historically in order to stay 92 
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below the 2°C target. In particular, the expansion of renewable energy technologies would need to be 93 
several times larger than the historical rate (Van Der Zwaan et al., 2013).  94 
 95 
However, the comparison of absolute future rates with historical rates does not correct for the stage of 96 
development for specific technologies nor the general growth in the size of the energy or electricity 97 
system. In this study we account for overall system growth by normalizing absolute indicators with 98 
metrics representing system growth, such as global GDP (in T$), global primary energy demand (in EJ), 99 
total electricity generation capacity (in GW) or total capital investments in the energy system (in billion 100 
USD$).  101 
 102 
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 104 
A similar analysis has been done by Loftus et al. (2014), who normalized electricity capacity 105 
deployment rates in various global decarbonization scenarios using global GDP. In their study they 106 
found that the rates of change are broadly consistent with historical experience. Only specific 107 
decarbonization scenarios with imposed restrictions on the implementation of clean and carbon 108 
sequestration technologies would lead to unprecedented rates of change for the remaining eligable low-109 
carbon energy technologies (Loftus et al. 2014).  110 
2.1.2 Indicator b): Technology diffusion 111 
Technology growth dynamics are generally characterized by S-shaped curves that show an initial 112 
‘formative’ phase, then rapid diffusion through an ‘upscaling’ phase and into a mature ‘growth’ phase 113 
which eventually slows to saturation (Grübler et al., 1999; Wilson, 2012). Growth rates vary over this 114 
technology lifecycle, beginning slowly until a lift-off point is reached and growth accelerates. After some 115 
time, an inflection point is passed and growth rates level off and eventually saturate, reducing growth to 116 
zero.  117 
 118 
Wilson et al. (2012) compared historical and future dynamics of technological diffusion in the energy 119 
system by fitting logistic growth curves (with a R-squared fit of 98% or higher) to cumulative capacity 120 
time series describing technologies’ full lifecycle from formative phase to saturation. The advantage of 121 
using cumulative capacity over the technology lifecycle, as opposed to installed capacity or growth 122 
rates during particular time periods, is that short-term volatility and potential selection biases towards 123 
specific periods of growth are avoided. From the logistic growth function various parameters can be 124 
extracted that respectively represent the duration of diffusion (∆t, between 10% to 90% of saturation) 125 
and the extent of growth or saturation point of a technology (the theoretical asymptote denoted as K). 126 
To account for the growing size of the energy system, Wilson et al. (2012) normalized the extent of 127 
diffusion by the size of the energy system (expressed in primary energy) at the midway point of each 128 
technology’s lifecycle (Tm, inflection point). The normalized K and ∆t create the extent-duration 129 
relationship for the number of technologies included. 130 
 131 
Technology diffusion = ( )diffusion rate*duration of diffusion( )
Extent (K) 
PE
(1
Tm
te '  132 
 133 
The main disadvantage of this methodology is that it is not readily comparable to recent observations or 134 
to maximum or frontier growth rates over short time periods. Moreover, only historical and future 135 
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technologies for which diffusion approximates logistic growth can be included in the analysis. This 136 
excludes, for example, wind and solar power whose growth to-date is still broadly exponential with no 137 
evidence of a slowdown towards saturation. The results from the methodology applied by Wilson et al. 138 
(2012) showed that the full lifecycles of advanced power generation technologies as modelled in many 139 
future scenarios have longer durations than the full lifecycles of energy technologies that have diffused 140 
historically. In other words, there is evidence that deep decarbonization scenarios may be somewhat 141 
conservative in their long-term technology growth dynamics. However, the authors acknowledged 142 
several caveats, including the possibility that comparing long-run historical growth with long-run future 143 
growth in this way is problematic. This was specifically the case for the analysis of coal or nuclear 144 
power, which combined historical and future growth dynamics in the logistic fitting procedure. 145 
 146 
2.1.3 Indicator c): Annual emission (intensity) decline rate 147 
Two indicators often used to gain insight into economy-wide changes are (1) annual emissions decline 148 
rate and 2) annual emission intensity decline rate (decarbonization rate) (Riahi et al., 2015; Van Vuuren 149 
et al., 2013).  150 
 151 
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 155 
The disadvantage of this generic descriptive indicator is that details on underlying drivers of emissions 156 
are not visible. Moreover, as emission reduction and emission intensity decline rates have not been 157 
major policy goals in the more distant past, a comparison against the long-term historical record can be 158 
regarded as having limited relevance. Nevertheless, the study by Van Vuuren et al. (2013) used 159 
historical comparisons to conclude that emission reductions as well as decarbonization rates for 160 
scenarios consistent with the 2ºC target can be regarded as extremely rapid compared to historical 161 
rates of change. 162 
 163 
2.1.4 Indicator d): Required supply-side investments 164 
Structural changes in the energy system are associated with increasing supply-side investments. As 165 
investments are also needed to achieve other social and economic goals there could be constraints in 166 
the required pace of change. Therefore, we look into the global investments into electricity generation 167 
and supply (including electricity storage and transmission and distribution, but not investments into the 168 
fossil fuel extraction sector nor the bio-energy fuel supply costs) to assess the efforts needed to 169 
mobilize an energy system transformation that is in line with the 2˚C objective. Demand-side 170 
investments are not taken into account as such estimates are subject to considerable uncertainty due 171 
to a lack of reliable statistics and definitional issues (McCollum et al. 2013). 172 
 173 
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 175 
As the total amount of investments is coupled to the size of the economy, we normalize the annual 176 
investments using global GDP, creating an indicator reflecting investments as percentage in total GDP. 177 
 178 
Annual required supply-side investments as share of GDP = 0
0
t tInvestments Investments %
t tGDP GDP

   179 
McCollum et al. (2013) examined absolute rates of change for investments in more detail, concluding 180 
that future investment levels remain consistent on the short term although significant increases in 181 
investments in both developed and developing countries will be necessary over the next decades under 182 
the 2°C objective.  183 
 184 
Table 1- overview of technology change indicators included for study 185 
Indicator Variations Metric 
a) Annual capacity addition  Average annual capacity addition GW/yr 
Normalized annual capacity addition GW/yr/ $ 
b) Technology diffusion  Normalized extent (K)  and duration ∆t  GW/EJ/year 
c)_Annual emission (intensity) decline rates Annual emission decline rate %/yr 
Annual emission intensity decline rates %//yr 
d) Required supply-side investments Annual required investments $/yr 
 Annual required investments as share of GDP %-share  
 186 
Table 2- overview of methodologies and the scope of this study 187 
Indicator System focus Temporal scale Spatial scale Normalization ( Metric)2 
a)  Annual capacity addition Technology specific Annual1 Global No 
 Technology specific Annual1 Global Yes (GDP) 
b) Technology diffusion Technology specific Lifetime Global Yes (Primary Energy) 
c) Annual emission 
(intensity) decline rates  Energy system Annual
1 Global / National Yes (GDP) 
d) Required supply-side 
investments Energy system Annual
1 Global No 
 Energy system Annual1 Global Yes (GDP) 
1 on average over a selected period of time  188 
2 This study depicts GDP throughout the results as the measure of growth, other metrics of growth are further discussed in the discussion 189 
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 190 
Figure 1 – Conceptual overview of the methodologies and key indicators. Panel (a) and (b) represent cumulative 191 
capacity of coal without CCS.  Although the figure demonstrates future (modeled) trends the 192 
analysis is similar for historical trends. 193 
2.2 Comparing future technological change to historical references 194 
2.2.1 Future rates of change 195 
We demonstrate the indicators by using three scenarios from a five-model study with varying 196 
assumptions on long-term international climate policy. A marked advantage of the multi-model 197 
approach is that it inherently accounts for technology biases and preferences among individual models. 198 
The study here, however, is not a model comparison: we only include the model range as an indication 199 
of the uncertainty in model results. We therefore do not discuss the results of individual models in any 200 
detail. The focus in the figures is also on the median of the range of model results. 201 
 202 
Five global energy-environment models are included in this study: REMIND:(Bauer et al., 2013; Luderer 203 
et al., 2013); MESSAGE: (Messner and Strubegger, 1995); IMAGE: (Bouwman et al., 2006); WITCH: 204 
(Bosetti et al., 2006) and TIAM-ECN: (Keppo and Zwaan, 2011)) (see table 3). These five models 205 
represent a diverse array of different solution frameworks (general equilibrium, partial equilibrium, 206 
dynamic recursive, perfect foresight and systems engineering) and differ in a variety of model 207 
characteristics, such as coverage of sectors and their disaggregation and in technological and socio-208 
economic assumptions that determine technology diffusion.  209 
 210 
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Table 3 - key model characteristics 211 
Name Time horizon Model category  Intertemporal Solution Methodology 
IMAGE 2100 Partial equilibrium Recursive dynamic 
MESSAGE 2100 General equilibrium Intertemporal optimization  
REMIND 2100 General equilibrium Intertemporal optimization 
TIAM-ECN 2100 Partial equilibrium Intertemporal optimization 
WITCH 2100 General equilibrium Intertemporal optimization 
 212 
The three scenarios that are used in this study are based on different policy assumptions for long-term 213 
international climate policy and have been developed as part of the LIMITS project (Kriegler et al., 214 
2013a). 215 
(1) The baseline (Baseline) scenario addresses the future energy system and emission 216 
developments in the absence of climate policy. This scenario is a best reference for historical 217 
rates of change as no climate policy is involved.  218 
(2) The second (Reference) scenario reflects current (unilateral) climate policy implementation 219 
based on national energy and climate targets for 2020 formulated as unconditional 220 
Copenhagen pledges. These targets are then extrapolated post-2020 by assuming similar 221 
levels of stringency in the subsequent decades. This scenario represents the current day 222 
situation and imposes no additional (technological) restrictions.  223 
(3) The third (2 Degrees) scenario is a cost-optimal mitigation scenario that assumes immediate 224 
global cooperation toward the long-term target of 2°C. This scenario represents the most 225 
optimistic view on technology availability, availability of carbon sinks and (bio-) resources to 226 
attain the 2°C climate target. 227 
Differences are created due to the varying assumptions on long-term international climate policy, all 228 
other factors, such as the penetration and expansion rates of technologies, are treated the same across 229 
all scenarios.  230 
 231 
The methods and indicators set out in Section 2.1 are comparatively applied on this set of three 232 
scenarios. As timing of change is important this study has restricted the analysis to the time period 233 
between 2010 and 2050 because it is considered most relevant for current policy and decision making. 234 
2.2.2 Historical references 235 
For the annual capacity addition indicator, we reconstruct a similar analysis to that of Van Der Zwaan et 236 
al. (2013) by comparing modeled average annual rates of change in total new installed capacity to 237 
historical average annual rates of change. Several databases provided historical data on various 238 
technologies (see Table 4) of which the decade with the largest absolute growth in capacity is selected 239 
for further analysis.  240 
For the technology diffusion indicator, similar logistic growth curves are constructed as in Wilson et al. 241 
(2012) on both historical (if applicable) and future time series. The historical time series begin as far 242 
back as the early 1900s (natural gas and coal power), the 1950s (nuclear power), the 1970s (wind 243 
power and solar PV), or start no sooner than the 2020s or later (CCS). 244 
For the emission (intensity) decline rate indicator, we depict average CO2 emission and carbon intensity 245 
reduction rates and compare them to historical national events that led to emission (intensity) 246 
reductions (such as oil crises, collapse of political regime) (Riahi et al., 2015; Van Vuuren et al., 2013). 247 
For the required investments indicator, we show the average annual investments or the share in GDP 248 
over the 2010–2050 timeframe and compare them to the historical investments (or share in GDP) over 249 
the 2000-2013 timeframe (IEA, 2014). 250 
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In order to normalize the absolute indicators to take into account relative changes in the size of the 251 
energy system or economy, we use GDP, primary energy, total energy system investments and total 252 
capacity as normalization metrics. The historical period taken into consideration is the 1980-2012 253 
period as most metrics have annual data available in public sources with investments as an exception 254 
(see Table 5). 255 
Table 4 - Overview of selected historical timeframes per indicator and the used databases  256 
Indicator Technology Historical reference Source 
a) Annual capacity addition PV 2003-2013 EPIA (2014 
Wind 2003-2013 GWEC (2014) 
Nuclear 1980-1990 Platts (2013) 
Biomass 2005-2011 (US EIA, 2014) 
Fossil 2003-2012 Platts (2013) 
CCS - - 
b) Technology diffusion PV 1970s Wilson et al. (2012) 
Wind 1970s 
Nuclear 1950s 
Fossil Early 1900s 
c) Annual emission intensity decline rates System 1970s-2000  Riahi et al. (2015) 
d) Required supply-side  investments System 2000-2013 IEA (2014a) 
 257 
Table 5 - Overview of normalization metrics, available historical timeframe and source  258 
Method Metric (Historical) timeframe Source 
Normalization  GDP 1980-2012 The World Bank (2015) 
Primary Energy 1980-2012 US EIA (2014) 
Investments 2000-2013 IEA (2014a) 
Capacity|Electricity 1980-2012 US EIA (2014) 
 259 
3 Results 260 
In the results below, we show the results of each of the indicators presented in Section 2 for the three 261 
LIMITS scenarios and all 5 models as well as the historical reference period. 262 
 263 
3.1 Annual capacity addition 264 
The modeled annual capacity additions (in GW) for the 2010-2030 period are on average consistent 265 
with the historical reference across all three scenarios. In the Baseline scenario, the expansion rates 266 
from 2010-2030 are broadly consistent with historical observations (see Figure 2). Coal without CCS 267 
maintains a constant annual expansion rate whereas gas without CCS will nearly double its current 268 
annual expansion rate, matching and overtaking coal without CCS. Under climate constraints, we find a 269 
shift away from fossil fuels either shifting to a less carbon-intense substitute (gas) or shifting to non-270 
fossil resources. For solar PV, wind and biomass the expansion rates stay within historical peak 271 
observations. The projections of nuclear power capacity growth are also consistent with historically 272 
observed expansion rates. However, currently planned additional nuclear capacity between 2015-2019 273 
(World Nuclear Association, 2014) indicates that the expansion rate of nuclear energy will most likely 274 
not exceed the 3GW/yr. Hence, given the long inertia in nuclear power plant planning and construction 275 
process, the actual expansion rates of nuclear power might continue to be below the deployment rates 276 
as depicted in some of the high scenarios.  277 
 278 
In the 2030-2050 timeframe, the modeled rates of annual capacity additions for non-fossil technologies 279 
increase beyond analogous technology-specific expansion rates observed historically. Some even 280 
exceed the maximum rates observed historically for any technology. Under Baseline assumptions, both 281 
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coal and gas without CCS will expand their growth to unprecedented levels as fossil fuels remain the 282 
fuel of choice. Under the 2°C objective (2 Degrees) the use of fossil fuel without CCS will gradually 283 
decrease or be substituted by CCS facilities. Moreover, the growth of solar and wind capacity will 284 
become particularly rapid, showing deployment rates above the historical peak value in the stringent 285 
climate policy (2 Degrees) scenario.  286 
 287 
 288 
Figure 2 - Average annual capacity additions (over the 2010-2030 and 2030-2050 period) for various electricity-289 
generation technologies under different climate policy assumptions. The horizontal lines indicate the technology-290 
specific peak or maximum value observed historically (solid lines) and the peak value across all technologies 291 
which is given by coal without CCS (dotted lines). The green, blue and red areas indicate whether a historical 292 
benchmark has been exceeded (red for all-technology peak, blue for technology-specific peak) or not (green).  293 
The bars indicate the range of modeled rates of change with the median value highlighted in black inside the 294 
bars. 295 
 296 
By accounting for system growth between historical and future periods (normalizing the annual capacity 297 
indicator using GDP growth), we find that future capacity additions are overall consistent with maximum 298 
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expansion rates of the most succesful technologies in the past (see Figure 3). On the short-term most 299 
outcomes remain within historical observation, whereas over the mid-term several technologies (wind 300 
and solar in particular) venture into territory that goes beyond the overall best system achievement from 301 
the past. 302 
 303 
 304 
Figure 3 - Average annual capacity additions (GW/yr), normalized using GDP (in trillion US$2005) for both 305 
historical data as well as scenario projections. The horizontal lines indicate the technology specific 306 
maximum value and the maximum value of any technology in the past. The green, blue and red 307 
areas indicate whether a historical benchmark has been exceeded (green below technology specific 308 
rate; blue above technology specific rate; red above the historical rate of any technology).  The bars 309 
indicate the range of modeled rates of change with the median value highlighted in black inside the 310 
bars. 311 
 312 
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3.2 Technology diffusion 313 
The modeled technology diffusion rates over the full technology lifecycle are analyzed using a 314 
methodology similar to that of Wilson et al. (2012). An extent-duration relationship (normalized K vs. ∆t, 315 
normalized with the total energy produced at the inflection point Tm) is constructed of all electricity 316 
generation technologies for three scenarios (see Figure 4). The extent-duration relationship depicts the 317 
extent to which technologies penetrate into the energy system and the time period until saturation is 318 
reached.  319 
 320 
In the Baseline scenario, fossil technologies mostly follow the historically observed patterns (i.e., the 321 
historical relationship between normalized K vs. ∆t data points across all technologies are in line with 322 
the relationship from modeled data points). However, the time periods to saturation are generally longer 323 
(further to the right) with the eventual saturation point often occurring beyond 2100.  324 
 325 
If climate policy is introduced, the extent-duration relationships change (Reference and 2 Degrees 326 
scenarios). Although all technologies shift to the left (shorter diffusion durations) the differences are the 327 
greatest for fossil without CCS technologies which show a lower capacity saturation level, a shorter 328 
lifecycle, and some capacity reduction in the year in which maximum growth is achieved (see the 329 
supplementary material online). For clean technologies (fossil with CCS, CO2 neutral and renewable 330 
energy technologies), the 2 Degrees scenario shows more a greater extent of growth and shorter 331 
diffusion durations. It would still require nearly a century of capacity growth and development to fully 332 
utilize the technological potential of clean technologies under the 2°C objective. This means that the 333 
expansion rates are very near to those of the most successful technologies in the past, yet the 334 
durations of full technology lifecycles remain above the historically observed pattern. In that sense this 335 
study is in agreement with Wilson et al. (2012) concluding that the modeled diffusion rates appear to be 336 
conservative compared to historically successful technologies. 337 
 338 
 339 
Figure 4 - Capacity growth of energy technologies in 3 future scenarios of the 21st century: extent vs. duration of 340 
growth using fitted logistic function parameters. Black dots represent historical extent-duration 341 
relationships of various energy-supply technologies (such as nuclear, coal and gas without CCS, 342 
hydro and refineries (FCC).  343 
3.3 Decarbonization rates 344 
Figure 5 shows the average annual emission decline rate and the decline rate normalized using GDP 345 
(creating a carbon intensity decline rate or decarbonization rate). Up till today, only rare historical 346 
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occurrences on a national level have led to significantly higher reduction rates than the global average, 347 
which have been negative (-0,8% per year on average throughout the 1970-2010 period) owing to 348 
continuously growing emissions worldwide. For example, fairly swift emissions reduction rates were 349 
observed in Sweden from 1974 to 2000 as a result of policy impulses on greening the Swedish energy 350 
system after the oil crisis in 1973 (2-3% per year). Another example is the emission decline rate of 2-351 
4% per year for Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries after the collapse of the Soviet 352 
Union (Riahi et al., 2015). To stay in line with the 2°C objective a sustained global carbon emission 353 
reduction rate of about 1% till 2030 is required, remaining within the earlier discussed regional historical 354 
boundaries. However, after 2030 the models depict a sustained global carbon emission reduction rate 355 
of 5% which goes beyond both global and regional historical achievements. 356 
 357 
Similarly, the global decarbonization rate has been around 0.5% over the period 1900–2010 and 358 
around 1% over the 1970–2010 (driven by technological change and sectoral shifts) (Van Vuuren et al., 359 
2013). If compared to the modeled decarbonization rates, we find ranges of 2-3% under Reference 360 
scenario assumptions whereas the margins expand to 6-10% by 2050 if 2°C is to be attained at the end 361 
of the century. These rates are considerably higher than the global average rate experienced in the 362 
past. At the regional level, historically faster rates can be observed than the global average: some 363 
Asian regions have managed to achieve decarbonization rates of 3–5% per year during the late 1980s 364 
and early 1990s. This would imply that the global rate would need to increase significantly, but also go 365 
beyond the most rapid (local) decarbonization rates experienced in the recent past and maintain this 366 
rate (globally) for several decades.  367 
 368 
13 
 
Figure 5 – Average annual emissions decline rates (top) and average annual emission intensity decline rates 369 
(bottom). Negative numbers indicate emissions increase. Green area implies consistency with 370 
historical evidence for global rates, blue represents values within historical bounds of the fastest 371 
regional reduction addressed and red implies beyond historical reference for either considered 372 
spatial scale. The bars indicate the range of modeled rates of change with the median value 373 
highlighted in black inside the bars. 374 
3.4 Required supply-side investments  375 
Rapid transitions in the energy system are associated with increasing investment flows compared to the 376 
status quo, which is reflected in Figure 6. Both current climate policy (Reference) as well as the 2°C 377 
pathway (2 Degrees) would require greater investments than the business-as-usual case (Baseline), 378 
climbing up on the short term to about 1.5 trillion USD per year which is slightly greater than observed 379 
historically. Under 2°C ambitions these investment levels are modeled to nearly double for the 380 
subsequent decade, increasing up to 2.5 trillion USD per year on average. Upscaling investments to 381 
these levels might pose several difficulties as two-third of the total sum is levied by developing areas 382 
(McCollum et al., 2013) which require finance mechanisms other than their own domestic funds 383 
(BOWEN et al., 2014). 384 
 385 
If total supply-side investments are expressed as a share in global GDP, it shows that the ratio remains 386 
within the bounds of historical experience. However, by looking into global rates it potentially masks the 387 
large differences between regions. The average investment intensity of developing economies was 388 
around 3.5%, whereas it was just 1.3% in industrialized countries (McColumn et al., 2014).  389 
 390 
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 391 
Figure 6 – Average annual supply-side investments (top) and average annual supply-side investments in GDP 392 
(bottom). Bars represent the range of model outcomes of respectively Baseline, Reference and 2 393 
Degrees1. The bars indicate the range of modeled rates of change with the median value highlighted 394 
in black inside the bars. 395 
 396 
4 Discussion 397 
4.1 Comparative overview of indicators and results 398 
This study uses a diverse set of indicators that assesses the consistency of modeled future energy 399 
transitions with the historical record. The study yields ambiguous insights into the consistency of 400 
modeled rates of change with historical observations (see Table 5). Absolute and near-term (2010-401 
2030) rates of change vary in their consistency with historical observations for the three scenarios, 402 
although these are mostly within the range of overall system achievements (blue shaded areas on the 403 
graphs). By normalizing the indicators to account for system growth shows an overall consistency with 404 
historical records is found. Over the longer term the indicators create a near similar picture for the 405 
                                                 
1 For the Baseline scenario, the numbers are recalculated, as they were not included in the study of McCollum et al. (2013). 
Due to data availability, only results for IMAGE and MESSAGE are shown here. The 2 Degrees scenario includes unilateral 
climate policy targets till 2020, suspending immediate global action, and therefore deviating from the 2 Degrees scenario as 
presented in other graphs. As the Reference and 2 Degrees scenario start to deviate only after 2020 the time periods are 
amended to 2020-2035 and 2035-2050. The historical observation consists of cumulative energy supply investments and 
cumulative total GDP from 2000-2013. 
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Baseline and Reference scenarios. However various significant differences emerge under the 2-degree 406 
objective (2 Degrees), specifically in terms of (absolute) capacity expansion rates, (absolute) total 407 
energy-supply investments and (absolute and normalized) decarbonization rates. 408 
 409 
Table 6 - Summary of comparisons between historical observations and three modeled scenarios using 410 
a diverse set of indicators. For plotting convenience the fossil and renewable technologies are grouped 411 
- the table considers the highest rate of change in the group per scenario 412 
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 413 
4.2 Methodological diversity and issues 414 
The indicators used vary in focus and scope. In this section we further discuss the influences and 415 
sensitivities of the study design on the outcome. 416 
 417 
(1) System focus: Models are inherently limited in their representation of energy-economy 418 
dynamics, and are highly dependent on their technological resolution (number of technologies 419 
included), underlying assumptions (on e.g. capital replacement or learning rates) as well as 420 
model structure and solution frameworks. In that respect technology-specific indicators are 421 
potentially more sensitive to specific model behavior than system-wide indicators. However, in 422 
a multi-model set-up these sensitivities are more-or-less balanced out and in that case, as 423 
depicted in Table 5, system indicators are not consistently more or less likely to remain 424 
consistent with historical observations;  425 
 426 
(2) Temporal scale: Indicators that focus on a specific timeframe (e.g. the average annual 427 
capacity additions or decarbonization rates) can be sensitive to the selected time period. This is 428 
especially the case if rapid expansion or declines rates are nested in certain periods of time, 429 
which can be either highlighted or numbed down in the longer-term average.   430 
 431 
Focusing on the full technology lifecycle, however, can also influence the results. For example, 432 
the Wilson et al (2012) methodology is sensitive to technology projections with a clear logistic 433 
growth profile, such as mature historical technologies for which long time-series data are 434 
available. As renewable technologies are generally still in their early deployment phase these 435 
are not expected to saturate in the timeframe of the model, and will therefore not appear as 436 
logistic growth profiles in the Wilson et al. methodology. Hence, some modeled rates of change 437 
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will not find application in the extent-duration analysis. The conservatism in the extent-duration 438 
curves could thus be an outcome of the overrepresentation of incumbent technologies;  439 
 440 
(3) Spatial scale: By focusing on global outcomes an indicator may potentially mask the large 441 
differences between regions. In this light the indicator provides only limited insights into the 442 
actual challenges that are faced to reach such rates of change.  443 
 444 
In the case where a global benchmark is absent (such is the case for emission and 445 
decarbonization decline rates) we selected a more local (contemporary) achieved peak value. 446 
Such a comparison inherently includes selection bias as frontier reduction rates have 447 
specifically been selected. However although these regional benchmarks only lasted for a short 448 
period of time and emerged under rare circumstances (such as oil crises and regime changes), 449 
these specifically underline the difficulty of achieving the needed rates of change; 450 
 451 
(4) Normalization: The normalization approach is visibly sensitive to the type of system growth 452 
metric used (see Figure 7). Monetary-based normalization metrics (GDP, investments and 453 
capacity to some degree as well) result in more conservative rates of change than energy-454 
based normalization metrics (primary energy). As a result, rates of change that are normalized 455 
by using monetary-based normalization metrics are less likely to exceed historical rates than 456 
those normalized using energy-based metrics. This is in particular true for indicators that 457 
experience rapid rates of change (for both technology-specify and system-focus indicators). 458 
 459 
Choosing the appropriate normalization metric is important – as the choice for a specific metric 460 
could render future rates of change (in)consistent with historical rates. The choice depends 461 
according to the authors on (a) the variable being normalized, and (b) the question being 462 
asked. For example, if the modeled variable is annual capacity additions, then (a) suggests 463 
using historical primary energy or capacity as the normalization metric, unless (b) the specific 464 
question is whether investment requirements in new capacity are in line with historical 465 
observations.   466 
 467 
In sum, the results of the indicators discussed in this study are associated with several methodological 468 
considerations. Applying a wide set of indicators therefore offers alternative, complementary insights 469 
into how scenarios compare with historical observations on two different scales (e.g. technology-470 
specific and system-wide indicators and the choice for normalization). Although none of the indicators 471 
provide conclusive insights as to the achievability of scenarios they are useful ways to contribute to 472 
scenario evaluation and provoke critical interpretation of results. 473 
 474 
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 475 
Figure 7 - Deviation of the median model value from the maximum peak benchmark per indicator for each 476 
considered normalization metric. Positive values indicate that the indicator exceeded historical 477 
experience whereas negative values imply consistency with historical observations. For plotting 478 
convenience the annual capacity additions are limited to nuclear, solar PV and wind technologies. 479 
Moreover, the investments indicator is plotted on the 2010-2030 and 2030-2050 timeframe but these 480 
represent the timeframes as depicted in paragraph 3.4. The picture focuses on the 2ºC objective. 481 
4.3 Expanding the scope of research 482 
By applying a diverse set of indicators one can gain more holistic insights into how scenarios compare 483 
with historical observations. Further research in line with this study could focus on: 484 
 485 
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(1) Fine-tuning and extending the scope of current indicators: Two fundamental regularities of 486 
successful technology diffusion patterns are described in Kramer and Haigh (2009). According 487 
to their study, the build rate of new and existing energy technologies follow two ‘laws’ which 488 
have been fairly consistent across energy technologies in the past. The first law describes how 489 
technologies grow quickly for the first two decades at exponential rates (+/-26%/yr) until 490 
‘materiality’ is reached, defined as a +/-1% share of the global energy system. The second law 491 
states that after materiality, growth rates level down to an eventual equilibrium or constant 492 
market share. Although the expansion phase and the maturing growth phase characterized by 493 
Wilson et al. (2012) broadly correspond with these 'fundamental laws', this could be embedded 494 
more clearly within the historical comparison methods. Moreover, additional insights may also 495 
be acquired by distinguishing between expanding systems (adding new capacity) and 496 
stabilizing systems (substituting existing capacity);  497 
 498 
(2) Introducing additional comparison methods: Modeled rates of change could be compared 499 
against actual trends over the same period of time, for instance a decade after the original 500 
projection was made. An example of such an exercise is found in van Vuuren and O’Neill 501 
(2006). If short-term model trajectories are significantly inconsistent with historical trajectories, 502 
it could expose conservatism in the long-term scenario logic and the assumptions on the 503 
driving forces. This methodology is, however, only useful if historical trends include similar 504 
climate policies as included in the model projections;  505 
 506 
(3) Including demand-side indicators: Historical and future emissions and their driving forces 507 
have also previously been studied by applying the Kaya-identity (Kaya, 1990). The Kaya-508 
decomposition analysis is applied in numerous studies (i.e. Steckel et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 509 
2009) to examine the implications of changes in total CO2 emissions on affluence (representing 510 
growth of economic activities), change in energy intensity (i.e. total primary energy over GPD 511 
reflecting efficiency and consumption patterns) and the carbon intensity (i.e. total CO2 512 
emissions over total primary energy). The three components could be assessed in tandem or 513 
as separate indicators in comparative work of prospective studies and historical records. This 514 
study has a greater energy supply orientation as all indicators focus on either energy supply 515 
technologies, investments or the carbon intensity of energy supply but future work could also 516 
include demand side indicators such as  energy intensity and affluence; 517 
 518 
(4) Going beyond the historical benchmark: This study considers history as an important 519 
benchmark, though history provides only limited information when looking at innovation. For 520 
example the results provide no further information about, amongst others, the drivers of 521 
technological change, (perceived) risks, scalability, structure of the industry or role of 522 
institutions. Expert elicitation could expand the knowledge on critical implementation barriers 523 
and further test the feasibility of prospective studies. Several prospective studies on technology 524 
development use expert elicitation protocols as a research tool to assess the feasibility of 525 
emerging (carbon-free) energy technologies (see for example Bosetti et al. 2012, Jenni et al. 526 
2013, Fiorese et al. 2014). Experts can go beyond the historical benchmark by providing 527 
probabilistic information on the likelihood that technologies will overcome particular hurdles and 528 
estimate the overall probability of success for each technology (Baker et al., 2009).  529 
  530 
5 Conclusions 531 
In this study we have compared indicators of change in future scenarios to historical trends for various 532 
degrees of climate policy. The analysis confronts scenario data from the LIMITS project to four 533 
methodologies that focus on different indicators of technology change, such as capacity expansion, 534 
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technology diffusion and changes in emission trends or investments. The main conclusions of this 535 
analysis are: 536 
 537 
The achievability of future rates of change depends on the indicator used. In this study, we 538 
assessed a variety of indicators to look at the rate of future change versus historically achieved rates of 539 
change. This comparison provides some insight into the effort involved in achieving these scenarios but 540 
is highly dependent on: (1) selecting the historical benchmark, (2) normalization, (3) data availability as 541 
well as the (4) underlying economic and technological assumptions, model structures and the included 542 
level of technological detail in the models. Although none of the indicators provide conclusive insights 543 
as to the achievability of scenarios they are useful ways to contribute to scenario evaluation and 544 
provoke critical interpretation of results.  545 
 546 
Indicators highlight that absolute rates of change in scenarios achieving the 2 degree target are 547 
rapid in the medium term compared to historically achieved rates of change. In absolute terms we 548 
have observed that projections are more-or-less in line with reported achievements on the short-term, 549 
but these increase to unprecedented levels by mid-century. Specifically the capacity expansion rates 550 
for solar and wind and required energy-supply investments are particularly strong under 2°C 551 
constraints, showing rates above the historical peak value of overall system achievements by 2030.  552 
 553 
Methods that look at relative rates of change by comparing the change to overall growth in the 554 
system conclude that future rates of change are generally within the range of successful 555 
transitions in the past. Indicators that account for the growth in the overall system show that the 556 
modeled rates of change in the scenarios are lower compared to the rates of change in the past. We 557 
find that monetary-based normalization metrics (GDP, investments and to some degree capacity) result 558 
in less conservative normalization than energy-based normalization metrics (primary energy). This is in 559 
particular true for indicators that experience rapid rates of change (for both technology-specify and 560 
system-focus indicators) 561 
References 562 
Baker, E., Chon, H., Keisler, J., 2009. Advanced solar R&D: Combining economic analysis with expert 563 
elicitations to inform climate policy. Energy Econ. 31, S37–S49. doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2007.10.008 564 
Bauer, N., Mouratiadou, I., Luderer, G., Baumstark, L., Brecha, R.J., Edenhofer, O., Kriegler, E., 2013. 565 
Global fossil energy markets and climate change mitigation – an analysis with REMIND. Clim. 566 
Change. doi:10.1007/s10584-013-0901-6 567 
Bosetti, V., Carraro, C., Galeotti, M., Massetti, E., Tavoni, M., 2006. WITCH: A World Induced Technical 568 
Change Hybrid Model. The Energy Journal, Special Issue: Hybrid Modeling of Energy-569 
Environment Policies: Reconciling Bottom-up and Top-down. 570 
Bosetti, V., Catenacci, M., Fiorese, G., Verdolini, E., 2012. The future prospect of PV and CSP solar 571 
technologies: An expert elicitation survey. Energy Policy 49, 308–317. 572 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2012.06.024 573 
Bouwman, A.F., Kram, T., Klein Goldewijk, K., 2006. Integrated modelling of global environmental 574 
change. An overview of IMAGE 2.4. Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. available at: 575 
www.mnp.nl\en, Bilthoven, The Netherlands. 576 
20 
 
BOWEN, A., CAMPIGLIO, E., TAVONI, M., 2014. A MACROECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON 577 
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: MEETING THE FINANCING CHALLENGE. Clim. Chang. 578 
Econ. 05, 1440005. doi:10.1142/S2010007814400053 579 
Clarke, L., Edmonds, J., Krey, V., Richels, R., Rose, S., Tavoni, M., 2009. International climate policy 580 
architectures: Overview of the EMF 22 International Scenarios. Energy Econ. 31, S64–S81. 581 
doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2009.10.013 582 
Clarke, L., Kim, S.H., Edmonds, J.A., Dooley, J., 2007. Model Documentation for the MiniCAM Climate 583 
Change Science Program Stabilization Scenarios: CCSP Product 2.1a. doi:PNNL-16735 584 
EPIA, 2014. Global Market Outlook for Photovoltaics 2014-2018. 585 
Fiorese, G., Catenacci, M., Bosetti, V., Verdolini, E., 2014. The power of biomass: Experts disclose the 586 
potential for success of bioenergy technologies. Energy Policy 65, 94–114. 587 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2013.10.015 588 
Grübler, A., Nakićenović, N., Victor, D.G., 1999. Dynamics of energy technologies and global change. 589 
Energy Policy 27, 247–280. doi:10.1016/S0301-4215(98)00067-6 590 
GWEC, 2014. Global Wind Statistics 2013. 591 
IEA, 2014. World Energy Investment Outlook 2014. 592 
Jenni, K.E., Baker, E.D., Nemet, G.F., 2013. Expert elicitations of energy penalties for carbon capture 593 
technologies. Int. J. Greenh. Gas Control 12, 136–145. doi:10.1016/j.ijggc.2012.11.022 594 
Kaya, Y., 1990. Impact of carbon dioxide emission control on GNP growth: interpretation of proposed 595 
scenarios, Paper presented at the IPCC Energy and Industry Subgroup, Response Strategies 596 
Working Group, Paris, France. 597 
Keppo, I., Zwaan, B., 2011. The Impact of Uncertainty in Climate Targets and CO2 Storage Availability 598 
on Long-Term Emissions Abatement. Environ. Model. Assess. 17, 177–191. doi:10.1007/s10666-599 
011-9283-1 600 
Kramer, G.J., Haigh, M., 2009. No quick switch to low-carbon energy. Nature 462, 568–9. 601 
doi:10.1038/462568a 602 
Kriegler, E., Petermann, N., Krey, V., Schwanitz, V.J., Luderer, G., Ashina, S., Bosetti, V., Eom, J., 603 
Kitous, A., Méjean, A., Paroussos, L., Sano, F., Turton, H., Wilson, C., Van Vuuren, D.P., 2015. 604 
Diagnostic indicators for integrated assessment models of climate policy. Technol. Forecast. Soc. 605 
Change 90, 45–61. doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.020 606 
Kriegler, E., Riahi, K., Bosetti, V., Capros, P., van Vuuren, D.P., Edenhofer, O., Weyant, J., n.d. 607 
Editorial. Clim. Chang. Econ. 608 
Kriegler, E., Tavoni, M., Aboumahboub, T., Luderer, G., Demaere, G., Krey, V., Riahi, K., Rosler, H., 609 
2013a. Can we still meet 2 ° C with global climate action ? The LIMITS study on implications of 610 
Durban Action Platform scenarios 1. Clim. Chang. Econ. 282846. 611 
21 
 
Kriegler, E., Weyant, J.P., Blanford, G.J., Krey, V., Clarke, L., Edmonds, J., Fawcett, A., Luderer, G., 612 
Riahi, K., Richels, R., Rose, S.K., Tavoni, M., Vuuren, D.P., 2013b. The role of technology for 613 
achieving climate policy objectives: overview of the EMF 27 study on global technology and 614 
climate policy strategies. Clim. Change. doi:10.1007/s10584-013-0953-7 615 
Loftus, P.J., Cohen, A.M., Long, J.C.S., Jenkins, J.D., 2014. A critical review of global decarbonization 616 
scenarios: what do they tell us about feasibility? Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Chang. n/a–n/a. 617 
doi:10.1002/wcc.324 618 
Luderer, G., Leimbach, M., Bauer, N., Kriegler, E., 2013. Description of the REMIND model (Version 619 
1.5). 620 
McCollum, D., Nagai, Y., Riahi, K., Marangoni, G., Calvin, K., Pietzcker, R., Van Vliet, J., Van Der 621 
Zwaan, B., 2013. ENERGY INVESTMENTS UNDER CLIMATE POLICY: A COMPARISON OF 622 
GLOBAL MODELS. Clim. Chang. Econ. 04, 1340010. doi:10.1142/S2010007813400101 623 
Messner, S., Strubegger, M., 1995. User’s guide for MESSAGE III. Working Paper WP-95-069. 624 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). 625 
Platt’s, 2013. World Power Plant Database, Scaling Dynamics of Energy Technologies Model. 626 
Riahi, K., Kriegler, E., Johnson, N., Bertram, C., den Elzen, M., Eom, J., Schaeffer, M., Edmonds, J., 627 
Isaac, M., Krey, V., Longden, T., Luderer, G., Méjean, A., McCollum, D.L., Mima, S., Turton, H., 628 
van Vuuren, D.P., Wada, K., Bosetti, V., Capros, P., Criqui, P., Hamdi-Cherif, M., Kainuma, M., 629 
Edenhofer, O., 2015. Locked into Copenhagen pledges — Implications of short-term emission 630 
targets for the cost and feasibility of long-term climate goals. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 90, 631 
8–23. doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.016 632 
Steckel, J., Jakob, M., Marschinski, R., Luderer, G., 2011. From carbonization to decarbonization?—633 
Past trends and future scenarios for China’s CO2 emissions. Energy Policy 39, 3443–3455. 634 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2011.03.042 635 
Tavoni, M., van der Zwaan, B., 2009. Nuclear Versus Coal Plus CCS: A Comparison of Two 636 
Competitive Base-Load Climate Control Options. Environ. Model. Assess. 16, 431–440. 637 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1516211 638 
The World Bank, 2015. GDP (current US$) | Data | Table [WWW Document]. URL 639 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries?display=default (accessed 640 
7.10.15). 641 
US EIA, 2014. International Energy Statistics [WWW Document]. URL 642 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=2&pid=28&aid=7&cid=CG6,CG5,&syid=2643 
005&eyid=2011&unit=MK (accessed 9.5.14). 644 
Van Der Zwaan, B.C.C., Rösler, H., Kober, T., Aboumahboub, T., Calvin, K. V, Gernaat, D.E.H.J., 645 
Marangoni, G., McCollum, D., 2013. A Cross-model Comparison of Global Long-term Technology 646 
Diffusion under a 2 ˚ C Climate Change Control Target. Clim. Chang. Econ. 1–17. 647 
Van Vuuren, D.P., O’Neill, B.C., 2006. The Consistency of IPCC’s SRES Scenarios to 1990–2000 648 
Trends and Recent Projections. Clim. Change 75, 9–46. doi:10.1007/s10584-005-9031-0 649 
22 
 
Van Vuuren, D.P., Stehfest, E., Vuuren, D.P., 2013. If climate action becomes urgent: the importance of 650 
response times for various climate strategies. Clim. Change. doi:10.1007/s10584-013-0769-5 651 
Weyant, J., Kriegler, E., 2014. Preface and introduction to EMF 27. Clim. Change 123, 345–352. 652 
doi:10.1007/s10584-014-1102-7 653 
Wilson, C., 2012. Up-scaling, formative phases, and learning in the historical diffusion of energy 654 
technologies. Energy Policy 50, 81–94. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2012.04.077 655 
Wilson, C., Grubler, a., Bauer, N., Krey, V., Riahi, K., 2012. Future capacity growth of energy 656 
technologies: are scenarios consistent with historical evidence? Clim. Change 118, 381–395. 657 
doi:10.1007/s10584-012-0618-y 658 
World Nuclear Association, 2014. WNA Reactor Database [WWW Document]. URL http://world-659 
nuclear.org/nucleardatabase/rdResults.aspx?id=27569 (accessed 9.21.14). 660 
Zhang, M., Mu, H., Ning, Y., 2009. Accounting for energy-related CO2 emission in China, 1991–2006. 661 
Energy Policy 37, 767–773. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2008.11.025 662 
 663 
 664 
Incremental capacity 
 per year
1200
1600
2000
2400
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Year
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 (G
W
)
 (a) Annual capacity addition
Ex
te
nt
 (K
)
...t
Tm
0
1000
2000
1900 1950 2000 2050 2100
Year
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 (G
W
)
(b) Technology Diffusion
Decarbonization rate 
 (% reduction 
 in CO2/GDP/yr)
0.25
0.50
0.75
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Year
Ca
rb
on
 in
te
ns
ity
  (
CO
2/
GD
P)
(c) Decarbonization rate
Total investments/ total GDP 
 (US$2005)
0
1
2
3
4
5
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Year
To
ta
l i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 in
 to
ta
l G
DP
 (%
)
(d) Investment levels
Conceptual overview of tested methodologies
line
Median value
Figure
Coal|w/o CCS Coal|w/ CCS Gas|w/o CCS Gas|w/ CCS
− −
−
− −
−
− − −
− − −
− − −
− −
−
− − −
− −
−
0
50
100
150
0
100
200
2010−2030
2030−2050
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Fossil technologies
Biomass|w/ CCS Biomass|w/o CCS Nuclear Solar|PV Wind
− − −
− − −
− − −
− − −
− − −
− − −
− −
−
− −
−
−
− −
− −
−
0
25
50
75
100
0
100
200
300
2010−2030
2030−2050
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Clean technologies
Absolute growth in annual capacity additions
An
nu
al 
Ch
an
ge
 (G
W
/yr
)
Historical.Reference
Peak [tech specific]
Peak [all tech]
Figure
Coal|w/o CCS Coal|w/ CCS Gas|w/o CCS Gas|w/ CCS
− − −
− − −
− − −
− − −
− − −
− −
−
− − −
− − −
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
2010−2030
2030−2050
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Fossil technologies
Biomass|w/ CCS Biomass|w/o CCS Nuclear Solar|PV Wind
− − −
− − −
− − −
− − −
− − −
− − −
− − −
− −
−
− − −
− −
−
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
2010−2030
2030−2050
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Ba
sel
ine
Re
fer
enc
e
2 D
egr
ees
Clean technologies
Annual capacity addition growth normalized using GDP
An
nu
al 
Ch
an
ge
 (G
W
/yr
/Tr
illi
on
 U
SD
$)
Historical.Reference
Peak [tech specific]
Peak [all tech]
Figure
Baseline Reference 2 Degrees
1e+00
1e+01
1e+02
1e+03
1e+04
1e+05
1e+06
50 100 50 100 50 100
Duration (years from 10% to 90% saturation)C
um
ula
tiv
e 
ca
pa
cit
y (
Ex
te
nt
) n
or
m
ali
ze
d 
to
 K
 (M
W
/E
J)
Historical Fossil Fossil + CCS CO2 Neutral Renewables
Figure
2010−2030 2030−2050
− −
−
− −
−
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
Baseline Reference 2 Degrees Baseline Reference 2 Degrees
Absolute growth
2010−2030 2030−2050
− −
−
− −
−
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
Baseline Reference 2 Degrees Baseline Reference 2 Degrees
Growth normalized using GDP (Decarbonization)
CO2 emission reductions
An
nu
al 
Ch
an
ge
 (%
/yr
)
Historical.Reference
Peak [Global]
Peak [Regional]
Figure
2020−2035 2035−2050
− − −
− −
−
0
1000
2000
3000
Baseline Reference 2 Degrees Baseline Reference 2 Degrees
Absolute growth
2020−2035 2035−2050
− −
−
− −
−
0
1
2
Baseline Reference 2 Degrees Baseline Reference 2 Degrees
Growth normalized using GDP
Investments in the energy system
ab
so
lut
e 
(U
SD
$/
yr
) (
to
p)
 a
nd
 n
or
m
ali
ze
d 
(%
−s
ha
re
 in
 G
DP
)(b
ot
to
m
)
Historical.Reference
Historical observation
Figure
An. cap. addition 
 Nuclear
An. cap. additions 
 Solar|PV
An. cap. additions 
 Wind
−100
−50
0
50
100
−100
−50
0
50
100
2010−2030
2030−2050
Glo
bal
 GD
P
Tot
al C
apa
city
Pri
ma
ry 
En
erg
y
En
erg
y In
ves
tme
nts
Glo
bal
 GD
P
Tot
al C
apa
city
Pri
ma
ry 
En
erg
y
En
erg
y In
ves
tme
nts
Glo
bal
 GD
P
Tot
al C
apa
city
Pri
ma
ry 
En
erg
y
En
erg
y In
ves
tme
nts
Technology−specific indicators
Investments Decarbonization
−100
−50
0
50
100
−100
−50
0
50
100
2010−2030
2030−2050
Glo
bal
 GD
P
Tot
al C
apa
city
Pri
ma
ry 
En
erg
y
En
erg
y In
ves
tme
nts
Glo
bal
 GD
P
Tot
al C
apa
city
Pri
ma
ry 
En
erg
y
En
erg
y In
ves
tme
nts
System−focus indicators
Normalization using various system growth metrics
%
 d
ev
iat
ion
 fr
om
 p
ea
k [
all
 te
ch
]
Figure
